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733 
THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHILD ABDUCTION 
AND UNILATERAL RELOCATIONS BY CUSTODIAL 
PARENTS: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE UNITED 
STATES AND EUROPE – ABBOTT, NEULINGER, 
ZARRAGA  
LINDA J. SILBERMAN* 
I. Introduction 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law has been at the 
forefront of efforts to deter child abduction across national borders.  The 
1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction1 created 
both a structure of cooperation among Central Authorities and a unique 
remedy of return of the child to achieve that objective.  The 1980 
Convention has been extremely successful, and eighty-six countries are 
now Parties to the Convention.  The subsequent 1996 Hague Convention on 
the Protection of Children2 built on the success of the 1980 Abduction 
Convention and provided for rules of jurisdiction and recognition of 
judgments relating to custody and child protection issues more generally, 
including specific provisions to address the problem of child abduction.3 It 
also incorporated provisions that continue the emphasis on cooperation 
among Contracting States.4  Professor Robert Spector, who has contributed 
so much to the development of family law and to international family law 
in particular, has been an important voice on the issue of child abduction.  
He has been a member of various United States Department delegations to 
                                                                                                                 
     * Martin Lipton Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; B.A. University 
of Michigan, 1965; J.D. University of Michigan, 1968.  The Filomen D’Agostino and Max 
E. Greenberg Research Fund has provided continuing financial support for my research and 
scholarship on international child abduction. 
     1. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, opened for 
signature Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501 [hereinafter Hague Abduction Convention]. 
     2. The formal title of the Convention is the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable 
Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children, opened for signature Oct. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1391 
[hereinafter Hague Protection of Children Convention].  As of October 1, 2011, the 
Convention has 33 Contracting Parties. 
     3. For a general overview of the 1996 Protection of Children Convention, see Linda 
Silberman, The 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children: Should the United 
States Join?, 34 FAM. L. QUART. 239 (2000), and more recently, Linda J. Silberman, 
Cooperative Efforts in Private International Law on Behalf of Children: The Hague 
Children’s Conventions, 323 RECUEIL DES COURS 390-429 (2006) [hereinafter Silberman, 
The Hague Children’s Conventions]. 
     4.  See Silberman, The Hague Children’s Conventions, supra note 3, at 425-29.  
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numerous Hague Special Commissions relating to the negotiation and 
operation of these Conventions.5  As the Reporter for the very successful 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,6 he will now 
take on the difficult task of revising that Act to implement of the 1996 
Protection of Children Convention in the United States.  
My tribute to Bob for this Symposium focuses on several recent 
developments the United States and in Europe relating to the 1980 
Convention. Some of those developments I applaud –  the Abbott decision 
in the Supreme Court of the United States and the recent Zarraga and 
Povse cases decided by the European Court of Justice.7  Other 
developments I find troubling, specifically  rulings by the European Court 
of Human Rights8 in the Neulinger v. Switzerland and Raban v. Romania 
cases.9  I am hoping (and guessing) that Bob Spector will share my views. 
II. The Supreme Court Decision in Abbott 
A. Background 
The important 2010 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Abbott v. Abbott10 brought the United States into line with the majority of 
countries interpreting the meaning of “custody rights” under the Abduction 
Convention.  The concept of   “custody rights” is central to the operation of 
                                                                                                                 
     5. Professor Spector and I were both members of the U.S. delegation to Hague 
Conference Special Commission that negotiated the 1996 Convention and both of us have 
been members of various U.S. delegations to other Special Commissions on the operation 
and oversight of both the Abduction and Protection of Children Conventions.   
     6.  Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 9 (Part IA) (1999) and pocket part (2010-11).  
     7. The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg is empowered to decide issues of 
European Community Law and its interpretation of the Brussels IIbis Regulation that 
provides for rules on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in family law matters is 
binding and must be applied by all domestic courts in all Member States.        
     8. The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg interprets the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  Those 
decisions are binding on the Member States, but the rulings are not directly effective within 
Member States in the way that decisions of the European Court of Justice are.  Also, the 
European Court of Human Rights may order compensation from a Member State to those 
whose rights may have been violated.   
     9. These recent cases in the European Court of  Human Rights are contrasted with the 
recent decisions in the European Court of Justice in Lara Walker & Paul Beaumont, Shifting 
the Balance Achieved by the Abduction Convention: The Contrasting Approaches of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, 7 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 
231 (2011).    
     10.  130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010). 
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the Convention, and the Court’s recognition of the need for an autonomous 
definition is significant.11  
The basic feature of the Abduction Convention is the obligation by 
Contracting States to “return” a child who has been wrongfully removed 
from or retained in another Contracting State.12  A removal is wrongful 
under the Convention if it is “in breach of rights of custody attributed to a 
person . . .  under the law of the State in which the child was habitually 
resident.”13   The Convention defines “rights of custody” as including (1) 
rights relating to the care of the person of the child and (2) in particular the 
right to determine the child’s place of residence.14  Thus the Convention 
offers a definition of “custody rights,” but the nature of the rights each party 
has is a function of the law of the habitual residence of the child.15 
It is clear from the negotiating history and the Convention itself that a 
party who has only access or visitation rights does not have “custody 
rights” under the Convention.  Thus violation of a party’s visitation or 
access rights alone does not give rise to a return remedy under the 
Convention. However, the question that had divided the lower courts in the 
United States (as well as courts in other countries) was whether a parent 
could be said to have a “right of custody” if , in addition to having a right of 
access, he or she was able (under  the applicable law) to restrict the other 
parent from moving a child across an international border without 
permission of the other parent.  This issue of whether a ne exeat right was a 
“right of custody” within the meaning of the Convention16 had become 
particularly controversial for several reasons.  
                                                                                                                 
     11. The need for autonomous concepts in the Abduction Convention, including that of 
“custody rights” is discussed in Linda J. Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Abduction 
Convention: In Search of a Global Jurisprudence, 38 U.C. DAV. L. REV. 1049, 1857-72 
(2005). 
     12.  Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, at art. 12. 
     13.  Id., art. 3. 
     14.  Id., art. 5 (a). 
     15. The reference in Article 3 to the “rights of custody” under the “law” of the State in 
which the child was habitually resident includes a reference to the rules of private internal 
law, i.e. the conflict of laws rules, of the State of habitual residence.  See Elisa Perez-Vera, 
Explanatory Report, in HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, ACTES AND 
DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIEME SESSION, TOME III (1982). 
     16.  See, e.g., Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1068 (2003); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 949 (2001).  
The Eleventh Circuit had taken the opposite view.  See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (11th 
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978 (2004). 
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When the Convention was finalized in 1980, and indeed when the United 
States completed ratification in 1988, the perception was that most of the 
abductors were non-custodial fathers who felt marginalized from their 
children, either because they had limited access rights and/or as a practical 
matter were being denied the opportunity to develop a real relationship with 
their children.17  More recently, however, the large majority of abductors 
have been custodial parents, primarily mothers.18   The reasons for these 
abductions are varied, ranging from situations where the woman is trying to 
escape from domestic violence to situations where the woman, often living 
abroad, desires to return to her home country where she will have family 
and a greater support network.19  Often, the mother will have been given 
custody of the child, but in many jurisdictions, the right of custody does not 
include the right to relocate with the child.  Thus, although she may be the 
custodial parent, the mother is not necessarily free to move to another 
jurisdiction with the child.  Because courts and legislators in numerous 
countries have taken seriously the psychological studies that emphasize the 
need for a child to have a continuing relationship with both parents, legal 
regimes have often made a custodial parent’s ability to relocate contingent 
upon the consent of the non-custodial parent, with a possible judicial 
override in special circumstances, in order to preserve the non-custodial 
parent’s right of access.20  Thus, many custody agreements or awards of 
custody will contain a restriction on the custodial parent’s right to move 
with the child, and even in the absence of an express restriction, the laws of 
many countries may include a requirement that both parents consent in 
order for a child to be removed from a country. Moreover, upon an 
application to relocate by the custodial parent, courts have been quite 
restrictive in permitting relocations when they find it would significantly 
interfere with the relationship of the child and the non-custodial parent.21 
                                                                                                                 
     17.  See Linda Silberman, The Hague Child Abduction Convention Turns Twenty: Gender 
Politics and Other Issues, 33 N.Y.U. J. LAW & POL. 221, 223-24 (2000). 
     18.  For data and several statistical studies showing the profile of an abducting parent, see 
Peter Ripley, A Defence of the Established Approach to the Grave Risk Exception in the 
Hague Child Abduction Convention,  4 JOUR. PRIV. INT. LAW 443, 454-55 (2008). 
     19. See Nicola Taylor & Marilyn Freeman, International Research Evidence on 
Relocation: Past, Present and Future, 44 FAM L. QUART. 317, 330 (2010). 
     20.  See generally Linda D. Elrod, National and International Momentum Builds for 
More Child Focus in Relocation Disputes, 44 FAM. L. QUART. 341, 351-64 (2010); Tim 
Carmody, International Judicial Perspectives on Relocation: Child Relocation: An 
Intractable International Family Law Problem, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 214, 215-30 (2007). 
     21.  For an overview of the law on relocation in the international context, see Jeremy D. 
Morely & James H. Maguire, International Relocation of Children: American and English 
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Thus, more and more custodial parents are unilaterally relocating – thereby 
wrongfully removing the child from the habitual residence.  In these 
situations, it is the non-custodial parent who seeks return of the child under 
the Abduction Convention. 
The Abbott case presented the precise issue of whether a non-custodial 
parent who holds a ne exeat right preventing the child from leaving the 
country has a “right of custody” under the Convention that would entitle the 
non-custodial parent to return of a child when the custodial parent 
unilaterally removes that child from the habitual residence without the 
consent of  the non-custodial parent (and without such consent being 
dispensed by a court).  The Supreme Court of the United States answered 
the question in the affirmative in a 6-3 decision, holding that a ne exeat 
right is a “custody right” and endorsing the proposition that the concept of 
“custody rights” in the Convention calls for an autonomous definition 
within the context of the Convention.22 
In Abbott, the British father and the American mother were living in 
Chile when the marriage broke down.  The Chilean courts granted the 
mother “daily care and control of the child” and the father was awarded 
“direct and regular” visitation rights, including every other weekend and the 
entire month of February.  Under Chilean law per statute, Mr. Abbott also 
had a ne exeat right: a right to consent before Ms. Abbott could take her son 
out of Chile, unless the court found that consent was being unreasonably 
withheld. Interestingly, Ms. Abbott also obtained her own ne exeat order 
preventing the child’s removal from Chile.  In August 2005, while 
proceedings before the Chilean court were still pending, Ms. Abbott took 
her son to Texas, without permission from either Mr. Abbott or the court.  
In February 2006, the mother brought a divorce action in Texas state court 
and requested a modification of Mr. Abbott’s rights, including her complete 
right to determine the child’s place of residence.  When Mr. Abbott’s 
request for visitation rights was denied, along with his request to return to 
Chile with his son, Mr. Abbott filed an action in Texas federal district court, 
requesting return of his son to Chile under the Convention and ICARA,23 
the federal statute implementing the Convention.  The district court denied 
relief on the ground that Mr. Abbott’s ne exeat right did not constitute a 
                                                                                                                 
Approaches, INT. FAM. LAW (June 2008), http://www.international-divorce.com/interna 
tional_relocation_of_children.htm.  See also Marly Sattler, Note: The Problem of Parental 
Relocation: Closing the Loophole in the Law of International Child Abduction, 67 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1709 (2010). 
     22.  Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990-91 (2010). 
     23.  International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611 (2006). 
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right of custody under the Convention and thus no return was required.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying on several other 
Court of Appeals cases in the United States to that effect.24 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve 
what it characterized as a conflict among the Circuits on this point.  In 
addition to the conflict among courts in the United States, the highest courts 
in other jurisdictions, including the House of Lords,25 had recognized ne 
exeat rights as constituting “rights of custody” that would afford a non-
custodial parent with such a right the ability to obtain return of the child.  
Justice Kennedy, writing for a six person majority of the Supreme Court, 
(which consisted of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor) held that a ne exeat right held by a non-custodial 
parent constitutes a  right of custody for which the remedy of return could 
be sought. 
B. Analysis of the Majority Opinion 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion addressed a number of important issues in 
resolving that question. He relied not only on the actual text of the 
Convention but also looked to the objectives of the Convention, citing to 
both the travaux preparatoire and the Perez-Vera Explanatory Report of the 
Convention.  The opinion pointed to both parts of the Article 5 Convention 
definition of “rights of custody,” which refers to (1) “rights relating to the 
care of the person of the child” and (2) “in particular, the right to determine 
the child’s place of residence.”26  The majority, in contrast to the dissent, 
believed that the “place of residence,” as defined in Article 5, should be 
understood to encompass the child’s country of residence in light of the 
Convention’s purpose to prevent wrongful removals across international 
borders.27  This was precisely the argument that Justice Sotomayor had 
made in her earlier dissent in Croll v. Croll,28 where she argued that the 
specific choice as to whether the child will live in England or Cuba, Hong 
Kong, or the United States, was precisely the kind of choice that the 
Convention was designed to protect and that to deny a return remedy for the 
violation of such a right would “legitimize the very action – removal of the 
                                                                                                                 
     24.  See, e.g., Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1068 (2003); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 949 (2001).   
     25.  In re D (A Child), [2007] 1 A.C. 619 (H.L.) 628, 633, 635, citing to an earlier Court 
of Appeal decision, C v. C, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654 (C.A.), 658. 
     26.  Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990. 
     27.  Id. at 1990-91. 
     28.  229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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child – that the home country sought to prevent”29 and would allow 
“parents to undermine the very purpose of the Convention.”30  However, 
even if “place of residence” referred to “street addresses” (as the dissent 
claimed), the majority observed that the ne exeat right meant Mr. Abbott 
could prevent the child from living at any street address outside of Chile.31  
Thus a ne exeat right properly fit the definition of a right of custody under 
Article 5.  The majority also believed that Mr. Abbott’s joint right to 
determine the child’s country of residence fell into the category of “rights 
relating to the care of the person of the child.”  Noting that the choice of 
residence implicated other aspects of the child’s upbringing, such as 
language, identity and culture, the majority concluded that these were all 
areas that “related to the care of the child.”32 
The Court acknowledged that a ne exeat right did not fit within 
traditional notions of physical custody, but emphasized that in interpreting 
an international convention, courts must forego reliance on local definitions 
of custody in order to accommodate different legal traditions necessarily 
reflected in an international convention.33  Further, it explicitly rejected the 
dissent’s contention that a ne exeat right was merely a “right of access,” 
characterizing that argument as “illogical and atextual.”34  As the majority 
explained, the joint right to decide a child’s country of residence does not 
fit the definition of “rights of access,” which is defined in the Convention as 
a “right to take a child for a limited period of time.”35 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is also significant in that it focused on the 
importance of ensuring international consistency in interpretation of the 
Convention and emphasized that courts should forego definitions that rely 
on local law usages in order to achieve an autonomous definition of 
Convention concepts.  To that end it gave great weight to the view of the 
Executive Branch, which it noted was “well informed concerning the 
diplomatic consequences of the Court’s interpretation, including the likely 
reaction of other Contracting States and the impact on the State 
Department’s ability to reclaim children abducted from this county.”36  In 
addition the Court relied upon decisions on the interpretation of “rights of 
                                                                                                                 
     29.  Id. at 133. 
     30.  Id. 
     31.  Abbott, 130 S.Ct. at 1991. 
     32.  Id. 
     33.  Id. 
     34.  Id. at 1992. 
     35.  Id. 
     36.  Id. at 1993. 
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custody” by the courts of other Contracting States37 and gave significant 
weight to the interpretation advocated by the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, which filed an Amicus Brief in support of the 
proposition that a right of access combined with a veto on the removal of a 
child from the jurisdiction constituted a “right of custody” under the 
Convention.38 
III. The Impact of Abbott on Relocation 
The Supreme Court’s recognition of ne exeat rights as “rights of 
custody” will obviously strengthen restrictions on relocation by providing 
the remedy of return when there has been a breach of such a restriction as in 
Abbott.  But that is not to say that the Convention has taken a position on 
the issue of whether or not relocation should be permitted without the 
consent of the non-custodial party.  States have the power to shape through 
their own laws whether a “right of custody” exists.  A country is free to use 
its own domestic law to give complete freedom to a custodial parent to 
relocate.  In such circumstances, a parent with only access rights would 
have no say in determining the child’s place of residence; and without a 
“right to determine the child’s place of residence” there would be no “right 
of custody” under the Convention definition and therefore no wrongful 
removal. The Abbott decision may be a catalyst for countries to re-examine 
their laws on relocation now that there is a general consensus that a 
unilateral decision on relocation in the face of a ne exeat restriction is a 
breach of “custody rights” that will trigger the Convention remedy of return 
of the child.39 
                                                                                                                 
     37.  The Court cited decisions of the House of Lords, the Israeli Supreme Court, the 
Supreme Court of Austria, and the Constitutional Courts of Germany and South Africa.  Id.  
It also acknowledged dicta by the Canadian Supreme Court that indicated it might not treat a 
permanent ne exeat order as creating a custody right and observed that the courts in France 
were divided.  Id. 
     38.  The Court also cited to the Hague Conference publication TRANSFRONTIER CONTACT 
CONCERNING CHILDREN: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE (2008) and to 
the Conclusions of the Special Commission of Oct. 1989 on the Operation of the Hague 
Convention, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 219 (1990) and the REPORT OF THE SECOND SPECIAL 
COMMISSION MEETING TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL 
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION (1993), both of which indicated that ne exeat 
rights were generally now understood to be “rights of custody” within the meaning of the 
Convention.  Id. at 1995. 
     39.  With this emerging consensus that unilateral relocations do constitute abductions, 
more and more attention has been focused on the question of when relocation by the 
custodial parent should be permitted.  See, e.g., CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss4/7
2011] UNILATERAL RELOCATIONS BY CUSTODIAL PARENTS 741 
 
 
States might be more open to relocation if there were greater assurance 
that visitation and access arrangements put in place in connection with 
permission to relocate by the state of habitual residence would be respected, 
both by the relocating parent and the courts of the state to which the parent 
and child are relocating.  For example, several state statutes in the United 
States direct a court to consider whether a foreign jurisdiction has a legal 
process in place to uphold custody agreements and enforce the visitation 
rights of non-custodial parents in determining whether to allow a custodial 
parent to relocate to that country with the child.  Whether or not the country 
of relocation is party to the Hague Convention might be a factor that a court 
considers when it adjudicates relocation disputes, although it is well 
understood that the enforcement of access provisions under the Abduction 
Convention is “weak” and that even Hague countries are not always robust 
with respect to the enforcement of access rights.40 What may be more 
significant in the future with respect to relocation is the impact of the 1996 
Hague Protection of Children Convention, which provides for recognition 
and enforcement of custody and access orders of Contracting States.  
Although the State of a new habitual residence can modify a prior custody 
or access order, the Hague Guide to Good Practice on Transfrontier Contact 
calls for a court in the State of relocation to be “very slow to disturb 
arrangements concerning contact made by the court which decided upon the 
relocation.”41 Moreover, there are other provisions in the 1996 Convention 
that can be used to encourage cooperation between courts in connection 
                                                                                                                 
THE FIFTH SPECIAL COMMISSION REVIEWING THE OPERATION OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION 
CONVENTION 11 (Oct./Nov. 2006) (encouraging attempt to “seek to resolve differences 
among legal systems so as to arrive as far as possible at a common approach and common 
standards as regards relocation”).  Two recent international judicial conferences addressed 
the relationship between international relocation and international abduction and formulated 
principles to guide States in addressing the problem.  See Washington Declaration on 
International Family Relocation (Mar. 23-25, 2010) and The London Conclusion and 
Resolutions on Relocation (June 30-July 2, 2010), reprinted as Appendix A and Appendix B 
in Elrod, supra note 19, at 369-74.  A Special Edition in 2010 of The Judges’ Newsletter, 
published by the Hague Conference, contains presentations given at the Washington 
Conference.  See THE JUDGES’ NEWSLETTER (Int’l Judicial Conference on Cross-Border 
Family Relocation, Wash. D.C.) Mar. 23-25 2010, (Special Edition No. 1 2010).  
     40.  See Linda Silberman, Patching Up the Abduction Convention: A Call for a New 
International Protocol and a Suggestion for Amendments to ICARA, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 41, 
48-50 (2003); Marguerite C. Walter, Toward the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions 
Concerning Transnational Parent-Child Contact, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2381, 2386-88 (2004). 
     41.  See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, TRANSFRONTIER 
CONTACT CONCERNING CHILDREN: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND A GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE § 
8.5.3 (2008). 
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with relocation. The decision in Abbott, which recognizes ne exeat rights as 
“rights of custody,” will likely encourage custodial parents to seek 
permission from courts to relocate, thereby focusing even more attention on 
that issue.  In turn, mechanisms to effectuate relocation will be more 
important than ever, and the provisions for cooperation and communication 
as well as the enforcement of access rights in the 1996 Protection of 
Children Convention may be helpful in that respect. 
IV. The Neulinger and Raban Decisions in the European Court of Human 
Rights 
The Abbot decision in the United States and judicial decisions by 
national courts in other countries, including those in Europe, have treated a 
parent’s unilateral decision to relocate in the face of judicial, statutory, or 
contractual restrictions on relocation as a wrongful removal.  But recent 
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights have undermined the 
efficacy of the Convention to deal with those types of abductions and have 
created a climate where unilateral relocations even in the face of express 
court orders preventing a custodial parent from removing the child, are 
likely to be encouraged. 
Neulinger v. Switzerland42 involved a unilateral relocation by a custodial 
mother in the face of a ne exeat restriction; Raban v. Romania43 concerned 
a unilateral removal by a custodial mother, who then claimed that there had 
been consent by the husband or alternatively that return would create a 
grave risk of harm under Article 13(1)(b). 
In Neulinger, the abduction occurred after the Israeli courts refused to lift 
a ne exeat order to allow the Swiss mother, who had custody of her son in 
Israel, to travel with her son to Switzerland, probably because they 
suspected she would not return.  The mother then unilaterally removed the 
child to Switzerland, where she hid the whereabouts of the child for a 
period of time; nonetheless, the father was able to find the child and file a 
Hague petition within a year of the wrongful removal.  The Swiss Federal 
Court, reversing the decisions of a district and appellate cantonal court, 
                                                                                                                 
     42.  Neulinger v. Switzerland, App. No. 41615/07, (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 6, 2010).  For 
other critical commentary on Neulinger, see Linda J. Silberman, International Decisions, 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction — custody rights — ne 
exeat rights, 105 A.J.I.L. 108-114 (2011); Lara Walker, The Impact of the Hague Abduction 
Convention on the Rights of the Family in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee: The Danger of Neulinger, 6 J. PRIV. INT. L. 
649 (2010). 
     43.  Raban v. Romania, App. No. 25437/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 26, 2010). 
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ordered the child returned by the end of September 2007.  Proceedings for 
enforcement of that order were never commenced because shortly after the 
order was entered, the abductor and her child brought proceedings in the 
European Court of Human Rights and challenged the return order as an 
interference with family life under Article 8 (1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.44 The President of the Chamber indicated to 
the Swiss Government that the return order should not be enforced while 
those proceedings were pending, and in June 2009, a Swiss district court 
provisionally granted sole parental authority to the mother for purposes of 
obtaining identity papers for the child.  In January 2009, a seven-person 
“initial” Chamber decided 4-3 that there had been no violation of Article 8;  
the Grand Chamber then took up the case and in July, 2010, it determined 
that Switzerland would be in violation of Article 8 if the order of return 
were now enforced. 
The decision of the Court of Human Rights is troubling, particularly as 
regards its understanding and interpretation of the Abduction Convention.  
The Swiss courts had considered the Article 13(1)(b) defense (where return 
can be refused if there is a grave risk that return would expose the child to 
harm or otherwise create an intolerable situation) and determined that the 
mother was able to return with the child to Israel and commence 
proceedings there.  But the Grand Chamber ruled that the situation must be 
assessed at the time of the enforcement of the return order – that is over two 
years after the return order was made and more than 4 years after the initial 
abduction.  Then the Grand Chamber determined for itself that the 
“settlement” of the child in the new country and the difficulties the mother 
faced if she returned to Israel were sufficient factors to establish that 
enforcement of a return order would interfere with family life.  The Court 
of Human Rights insisted that it had the responsibility to “ascertain whether 
the domestic courts conducted an in-depth examination of the entire family 
situation and of a whole series of factors” as to what would be best for an 
abducted child in the context of an application for return.  But that inquiry 
misconceives the role of a court hearing a petition for return, which under 
the Convention is to ensure the child’s safety and well-being in making an 
order of return.  The assessment of the “entire family situation” is for the 
courts of the habitual residence to make in its merits determination of 
custody.  The Grand Chamber’s analysis also misconceives the role of 
                                                                                                                 
     44.  Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: “Everyone has 
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”  See 
European Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
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Article 12 of the Abduction Convention, which provides a defense to return 
if the child is settled in its new environment, but only when the Hague 
return proceedings are commenced after one-year of the wrongful removal 
or retention.  As noted, proceedings under the Hague Convention were 
instituted in Switzerland well within a year of the abduction; nonetheless 
the Grand Chamber applied the “well-settled” concept to the time the child 
had been in Switzerland since the abduction.  Would-be abductors may well 
take heart from the message sent by Neulinger: abduct, hide, and prolong 
proceedings so that the child can be considered “well-settled.”  
In a subsequent decision, Raban v. Romania, the Court of Human Rights 
again failed to correctly interpret the Abduction in the context of a 
unilateral relocation by the mother.  In Raban, the parties had “joint 
custody” when the mother took the child from Israel to Romania.  The two 
children had been born in Israel and the parents had lived for a number of 
years in Israel with their children.  Upon divorce, the Israeli court ordered 
that the parents have “joint custody” of the children.  The mother and 
children purchased a roundtrip ticket to Romania, ostensibly to visit the 
wife’s mother, but once in Romania the mother announced that she and the 
children would not return to Israel.  The husband filed a Hague petition in 
Romania and the first instance court in Romania ordered the children 
returned, rejecting arguments by the mother that the husband had consented 
that the children could go to Romania and that the state of insecurity in 
Israel created a “grave risk of harm” to the children.  In a 2-1 decision the 
appellate court reversed, finding that the father had given his consent for 
the children to remain in Romania until his financial situation improved and 
that the possibility of terrorist attacks in Israel created a “grave risk of 
exposing the children to intolerable physical harm.” The father (on both his 
own behalf and that of the children) filed a petition with the European 
Court of Human Rights.  The European Court considered the question as 
one which involved the applicants’ right to family life protected under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  The Court 
characterized its task as one of determining whether the national court had 
struck a fair balance between the competing interests of the child, the 
parents and the public order – within the margin of appreciation afforded to 
the States in such matters.  Relying upon that “margin of appreciation,” the 
Court of Human Rights found that the national court had sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the father had given his consent to the relocation 
and that the children were well-integrated and well taken care of by their 
mother.  The Court emphasized that its task was not to reassess the 
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evaluation by the domestic authorities, unless there was clear evidence of 
arbitrariness, which it did not find in the present case.  
One might, of course, ask why the same “margin of appreciation” did not 
suffice to uphold the return order by the Swiss authorities in Neulinger.  
Moreover, what is troubling in both Neulinger and Rabin is the failure of 
the Court of Human Rights to correctly interpret and apply the provisions of 
the Abduction Convention.  In relying upon the fact that the children were 
integrated into their new environment and well-cared for, the Court 
permitted an inquiry that the Convention authorizes only if a year has 
elapsed since the alleged abduction and the commencement of proceedings.  
In both Neulinger and Rabin, the Court of Human Rights effectively 
expanded the “grave risk” of harm exception to include a “well-settled” 
exception that the Convention itself does not condone.  Moreover, the Court 
of Human Rights misconceives the role of a court hearing a petition for 
return by allowing a broader substantive “best interests” inquiry to be made 
by the authorities in the refuge state. 
These recent decisions by the European Court of Human Rights are 
disappointing and are in tension with the effective operation of the Hague 
Abduction Convention.  This trend is directly opposite to earlier positions 
taken by the Court, which  had rendered interpretations of the European 
Convention that reinforced the structure and mechanisms adopted in the 
Hague Convention.45  Numerous rulings by the Court had rejected 
complaints by abductors that orders of return by domestic courts pursuant 
to the Convention interfered with family life.  In particular, the Court had 
previously rejected the argument that return of the child in the absence of 
the custodial mother would create an intolerable situation, thereby 
providing a defense to return under Article 13(1)(b).46  Although stressing 
“best interests of the child,” the Court had previously emphasized that the 
child should not be removed unilaterally by one parent and kept away from 
the other parent,47 and appeared to accept that “best interests” are consistent 
with a narrow construction of the Article 13 exceptions.48 
                                                                                                                 
     45. For an extensive overview of the case law in the European Court of Rights on 
numerous issues in respect of the Hague Abduction Convention, see the Hague lectures by 
Paul R. Beaumont, The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Justice on the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 335 
RECUEIL DES COURS 13-103 (2008). 
     46. See Maumousseau & Washington v. France (App No 39388/05) (Eur. Ct. H.R., Jan. 
8, 2008).  For a more detailed discussion of the Maumousseau case in this respect, see 
Beaumont, supra note 44, at 61-64. 
     47. See Walker, supra note 41, at 664; see also Beaumont, supra note 44, at 37-39. 
     48. See Beaumont, supra note 44, at 61-63. 
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V. The European Court of Justice and the Zarraga Case 
Not all the developments in Europe are so discouraging.  In the recent 
judgment, Zarraga v. Pelz,49 the European Court of Justice held that the 
order of return of a child to Spain by the Spanish court — the habitual 
residence of the child — was immediately enforceable in Germany 
notwithstanding a German court’s refusal to return the child on application 
for return under the Hague Convention.  The Brussels IIbis Regulation50  
sets forth rules for jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in family law 
matters.  Several provisions relate specifically to child abduction issues, 
including sub-paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 11 of the Regulation, which 
provide that if the court of the State that was the habitual residence of the 
child prior to the wrongful removal requires return of the child, that 
judgment is enforceable and overrides the refusal to return by another 
court.51  In Zarraga, the Spanish court, which was the habitual residence of 
the child and the parents, provisionally awarded custody to the father and 
access to the mother.  The mother moved to Germany, and following a 
period of access with the child in Germany refused to return the child to 
                                                                                                                 
     49. Case C-491/10PPU, Zarraga v. Pelz.  The decision is available on the Hague Incadat 
data base at HC/E/1043. 
     50. See Council Regulation (EC)No.2201/2003 of Nov. 27, 2003 Concerning Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters 
of Parental Responsibility [hereinafter the Brussels IIbis Regulation].  The Brussels IIbis 
Regulation is directly applicable in all EU Members States, with the exception of Denmark, 
and prevails over national law.  For an excellent overview of the Regulation, see Peter 
McEleavy, Private International Law:  Brussels IIbis: Matrimonial Matters, Parental 
Responsibility, Child Abduction and Mutual Recognition, 53 INT. & COMP. L. QUART. 503 
(2004). 
     51. The Regulation imposes certain procedural steps that must be taken to activate the 
override.  Pursuant to Article 11(6) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, a court of a Member 
State that has issued a decision of non-return based upon Article 13 of the Abduction 
Convention must immediately transmit a copy of its decision together with the relevant 
documents to the competent court in the Member States where the child was originally 
habitually resident.  Article 11(7) requires the court of original habitual residence, if it is not 
already seised of the matter by one of the parties, to notify the parties and invite them to 
make submissions within three months in order for the court to examine the question of 
custody.  If the left-behind parent succeeds in the court of the original habitual residence in 
obtaining an order of custody and return of the child, Article 11(8) provides that such a 
decision prevails over the earlier judgment of non-return under the Abduction Convention 
and is enforceable pursuant to the enforcement procedures of the Regulation.  For a more 
detailed discussion of these provisions, see Peter McEleavy, The New Child Abduction 
Regime in the European Union: Symbiotic Relationship or Forced Partnership?, 1 J. OF 
PRIV. INT. L. 5 (2005). 
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Spain.  Further custody proceedings took place in Spain in which neither 
the mother nor child participated because the Spanish court would not grant 
a request by the mother that she and the child be allowed to leave Spain 
were they to attend.  During the course of the Spanish proceedings, the 
father also filed an application in Germany for return of the child under the 
Hague Abduction Convention.  Return was ordered by the first instance 
court in Germany but overturned on appeal on the basis of the child’s 
objections under Article 13(b)(2).  Shortly thereafter, the Spanish court 
rendered a decision awarding sole custody to the father.  Subsequently, the 
Spanish court issued a certificate pursuant to Article 42 of the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, which entitles the Spanish judgment to immediate recognition 
and enforcement in Germany.52  The first instance court in Germany 
refused to enforce the judgment on the ground that the Spanish judgment 
had been rendered in violation of human rights, specifically Article 24 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, because the 
child had not been heard in the Spanish proceedings.  On appeal by the 
father, the German  appellate court referred the question to the European 
Court of Justice.  The ECJ held the Spanish order enforceable, emphasizing 
that under Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, the court of the 
original state of habitual residence has exclusive jurisdiction to decide 
whether the child is to be returned.  Accordingly, the Spanish return order 
was immediately enforceable and any challenge should have been made in 
the Spanish court.53 
                                                                                                                 
     52. Article 42 provides that an order for return of the child shall be recognized and 
enforceable in another Member States without the need for a declaration of enforceability 
and without any possibility of opposing its recognition if the judgment has been certified in 
the Member State of origin.  Under paragraph (2) of Article 42, the judge who delivers a 
judgment ordering return of the child under Article 11(8) shall issue the certificate only if 
the child and the parties were given an opportunity to be heard and the court has taken into 
account the reasons that the court of another Member State had refused return of the child. 
53. In a recent article in the Journal of Private International Law, Lara Walker and Paul 
Beaumont criticize the issuance of the Article 42 certificate by Spain in circumstances where 
the child was not heard in the Spanish proceedings pursuant to Article 42. My own view on 
that issue is different.  Although the  objections of the nine-and-a-half year-old child were 
the basis of the German appellate court’s refusal to return, the first-instance court in 
Germany had found that the child was not sufficiently mature for those views to be given 
decisive weight. Moreover, the mother would not make the child available in Spain because 
she was not assured that she could leave Spanish territory if she appeared with the child.  
The child’s views were known, and the Spanish court should be able to decide for itself how 
much weight to accord those views, particularly in light of the fact that the child had been in 
the de facto custody of the mother for the past two years.  For a different assessment of the 
issue by Walker and Beaumont, see Walker & Beaumont, supra note 9, at 239-48. 
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The Zarraga case follows from an earlier decision of the European Court 
of Justice, Povse v. Alpago,54 involving a situation where the parties were 
unmarried and the mother took the child from Italy where they were living 
to Austria, despite an order from the Italian court preventing the mother 
from removing the child from the jurisdiction.  Although the Austrian court 
refused return of the child, the Italian court subsequently issued an order of 
return pursuant to Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.  The 
European Court of Justice held that the Italian order of return, although in 
connection with a provisional custody order, came within Article 11(8) and 
was properly certified.  Accordingly, it was required to be enforced in 
Austria.  The Court noted that any argument about changed circumstances 
should have been raised before the Italian court, which was the court of the 
Sate of habitual residence. 
It remains to be seen whether there will be any attempt to pursue the 
Zarraga matter before the European Court of Human Rights in light of the 
“best interests” gloss that the Human Rights Court has imposed on the 
Abduction Convention. Should that occur, the European Court of Human 
Rights should acknowledge the division of power between the courts of the 
Member State of original habitual residence and the Member State to which 
the child has been taken.  This allocation along with a principle of mutual 
trust and confidence has been reinforced by the European Court of Justice 
in its decisions in Zarraga and Povse.  Substantive judgments, including 
concerns about violation of fundamental human rights or any change of 
circumstances affecting the best interests of the child, are to be raised 
exclusively before the competent court of the Member State of original 
habitual residence.  The Brussels IIbis Regulation rests on the principle that 
control of the merits is given to the court which has jurisdiction, which also 
has an obligation to secure and protect fundamental rights. 
VI. Conclusion 
The Hague Abduction Convention has been a major force in remedying 
international child abductions, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Abbott 
was an important step in ensuring that the Convention continue in that role.  
Within the European Community, the Convention has been strengthened 
through the provisions of the Brussels IIbis Regulation that give primacy to 
an order of return by the habitual residence over a non-return decision by 
the refuge state, and the European Court of Justice has given a strong 
endorsement to that proposition in its two recent decisions in Povse and 
                                                                                                                 
54. Case C-211/10 PPU  (Eur. Ct. of Justice, May 3, 2010). 
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Zarrega.  Unfortunately, the European Court of Human Rights has become 
an intrusive and undermining force in the efforts to remedy international 
parental child abduction.  As noted earlier, in both Neulinger and Rabin, the 
Court of Human Rights misconstrued the Convention in various ways and 
created a substantive “best interests of the child” overlay without regard to 
the important private international law principle in the Convention that the 
appropriate court to make that “best interests” assessment is that of the 
State of the original habitual residence.  That is not to ignore the extreme 
case where return should not be ordered, but the basic architecture of the 
Convention is sound and should not be altered. 
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